Distribution forecast targeting in an open-economy, macroeconomic volatility and financial implications by Flamini, Alessandro & Milas, Costas
Distribution Forecast Targeting in an Open-economy, Macroeconomic Volatility and Financial 
Implications1 
 
Alessandro Flamini (corresponding author) 
University of Pavia 
Via S. Felice, 27100 Pavia, Italy 
alessandro.flamini@unipv.it 
 
 
Costas Milas, 
University of Liverpool 
Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK 
costas.milas@liverpool.ac.uk 
 
                                                             
1 We thank for useful comments and discussions Michael Arghyrou, Guido Ascari, Martina Bozzola, Mustafa Caglayan, 
Francesca Carapella, John Driffill, Andrea Fracasso, Petra Geraats, Luigi Guiso, Michael Lamla, Patrick Minford, Kostas 
Mouratidis, Luigi Paciello, Francesco Ravazzolo, Luca Sala, Federico Ravenna, Christie Smith, Ulf Söderström, Daniele 
Terlizzese, Cedric Tille, Tim Worrall, Charles Wyplosz, and participants to the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, 
ICMAIF Crete Annual Conference, European Economic Association Annual Conference, Money, Macro and Finance 
Research Group Annual Conference, Colloquium in Honor of Professor Hans Genberg, and seminars at Birkbeck College, 
Cambridge University, Cardiff University, Einaudi Insitute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), Norges Bank and University of 
Pavia. We are grateful to the anonymous referee for useful and constructive suggestions. Any remaining mistake is our 
own responsibility. 
 
Distribution Forecast Targeting in an Open-economy,1
Macroeconomic Volatility and Financial Implications2
3
Abstract4
In an open-economy faced with parameter uncertainty, this paper uses distribution fore-5
casts to investigate the impact of alternative ination targeting policies on macroeconomic6
volatility and their potential implications on nancial stability. Theoretically, Domestic7
Ination Targeting (DIT) leads to less volatility than Consumer Price index Ination Tar-8
geting (CPIIT) for several macroeconomic variables and, in particular, for the interest rate.9
Empirically, a positive relationship between interest rate volatility and nancial instability10
emerges for the US, UK and Sweden since the early 1990s. Bridging theory and empirical11
evidence, we conclude that the choice of the ination targeting regime has an important12
impact on macroeconomic volatility and potential implications for nancial stability.13
14
JEL Classi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1 Introduction19
Central banks are called to take monetary policy decisions in an uncertain contest. As a result,20
policy practice and research have always been challenged to experiment more e¢ cient ways to21
tackle uncertainty. In this respect, during the last decade, distribution forecasts of the main22
macroeconomic variables, commonly known as fan charts, have become an important instrument23
for both monetary policy decisions and communication with the public1. A key feature of a24
distribution forecast is its volatility at each future point in time. This information matters in25
that lower volatility implies more forecast accuracy and, in general, less expected uncertainty26
surrounding the path of the variable at issue.27
Motivated by the pervasive role played by uncertainty in the decision making process of28
any economic agent, this paper rst theoretically investigates to what extent, if any, alternative29
ination targeting policies impact on the expected volatility of the macroeconomic variables in30
presence of parameter uncertainty. We choose an open-economy framework as in this case the31
presence of the exchange rate even more separates alternative ination targeting policies. In32
this framework, we compare the performance of di¤erent ination targeting policies in terms33
of the expected volatility of the macroeconomic variables. Our motivation, in doing so, stems34
from the fact that central banks continuously face various types of uncertainty in setting the35
monetary policy, an important one being parameter uncertainty. Furthermore, this matters for36
the private sector, which has to constantly take decisions subject to the expected distribution37
forecast of ination, output gap and the interest rate.38
In line with this motivation, our interest on "raw" expected volatilities rather than a function39
of these volatilities, as a utility based welfare measure, is due to the fact that the former40
bears the advantage to be operational for policy decisions. Specically, investigating expected41
volatilities of the macroeconomic variables is consistent with the ination forecast targeting42
operating procedure in use at various central banks as the Bank of England, Swedens Riksbank,43
Norways Norges Bank, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. In contrast, a utility based44
welfare measure it is not (Holmsen, Qvigstad, Røisland and Solberg-Johansen 2008, Svensson45
2010, Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Svensson 2011). As to the policies, the focus is on Domestic46
Ination Targeting (DIT), where the central bank aims to stabilize ination related to the goods47
domestically produced, and CPI Ination Targeting (CPIIT), which also considers the goods48
1 Indeed, a large number of central bank during this period have released to the general public the distribution
forecasts of ination and real activity by publishing these forecasts on their website. Some central banks have
also published the distribution forecast of the interest rate.
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imported from the rest of the world.49
These alternative policies can be respectively referred to the stabilization of core ination50
and headline ination. Core ination, which excludes international food and energy prices from51
the consumer basket, tends to be used as a proxy for domestic ination2. Generally, central52
banks target headline ination. Yet there is one central bank, the Bank of Thailand, that53
explicitly targets core ination. Furthermore, in most central banks core ination is constantly54
monitored and plays an important role in decision-making and communication. The Norges55
Bank of Norway, for example, reports on its home page both current core ination and CPI56
ination stating that uses the former as an operational guide since it can better indicate the57
underlying trend of ination.58
With respect to the Fed, however, it has been found that core ination is not necessarily59
the best predictor of total ination (Crone, Khettry, Mester and Novak, 2013). Nevertheless, as60
argued by Mishkin (2007), both for the purposes of internal deliberations and for communica-61
tions with the public, central bankers are truly concerned with the underlying rate of ination,62
for which core ination can be a useful proxy.63
Thus, in our opinion, comparing the performance of the alternative targeting policies in64
terms of the expected volatility of the main macrovariables should not simply be used to judge65
the superiority of one policy over the other in this specic respect. Rather, more broadly, volatil-66
ities comparison is useful to see how both policies can complement each other in decision-making67
and communication with the public. We think this especially matters when it is acknowledged68
that policymakers continuously face, among the others, parameter uncertainty. With this caveat69
in mind, the main result of our analysis is that, considering parameter uncertainty, DIT implies70
less volatility of the main macroeconomic variables than CPIIT, in particular for the interest71
rate. This nding is relevant for real-world monetary policy e¤ectiveness. Indeed, best practice72
monetary policy is largely implemented via forward guidance by steering short-term interest73
rates and shaping the expected path of these short rates. By making this task harder, inter-74
est rate volatility plays against here. Empirically, Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana,75
Rubio-Ramírez, Uribe (2011) show that interest rate volatility matters as it a¤ects output, con-76
sumption and investment in emerging small open economies. Thus, this result is important per77
se as it suggests that giving more attention to the stabilization of domestic ination can reduce78
macroeconomic volatility.79
2 It is worth noticing that the correlation between domestic price ination and CPI ination for the countries
that we empirically study in this paper, i.e. US, UK and Sweden is, respectively, 0.85, 0.87, and 0.92 .
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In addition, beyond being a key variable in the real sector, the interest rate is a key variable80
also in the nancial sector. Sharp increases in the o¢ cial interest rate strain nancial markets,81
as it occurred for example in 1994 in the US. In general, changes in the current and expected82
future o¢ cial rates are transmitted to market rates and asset prices. We thus conjecture that83
excessive short-term interest rate volatility can be associated with nancial instability. In84
empirically testing this hypothesis, we nd a signicant positive relation between interest rate85
volatility and nancial instability in all US, UK and Swedish economies since the early 1990s.86
This second result of the paper thus suggests that concentrating on DIT rather than CPIIT can87
also assist in fostering nancial stability.88
The intuition for these ndings is based on the combined action of three factors. The level89
of policy activism implied by the choice of the ination targeting policies, the consideration90
of parameter uncertainty on the part of the central bank, and the transmission mechanism of91
monetary policy to the real and nancial sector. Our ndings show that under CPIIT there92
is more policy activism than under DIT. Thus, when the central bank decides the optimal93
policy and takes into account model parameter uncertainty, a more active policy results in more94
volatility for most of the macroeconomic variables, market rates and asset prices.95
Arguably, the ndings that we have obtained have important policy implications for ination-96
targeting economies like the US, UK and Sweden. According to our theoretical results, more97
emphasis on DIT (or to a targeting policy closer to DIT than CPIIT) would lower interest rate98
volatility. The benecial impact of the latter potentially extends to nancial stability. In March99
2013, Ben Bernanke noted that in order to address nancial stability concerns the Federal Open100
Market Committee (FOMC) amongst other things now provides greater clarity concerning the101
likely course of the federal funds rate. Indeed, the empirical part of our paper shows that lower102
interest rate volatility (which we proxy by the 2-year moving standard deviation of the interest103
rate and a GARCH representation) reduces nancial instability in all three economies.104
The literature on the choice of the ination measure to stabilize has identied various im-105
portant factors to consider. Mankiw and Reis (2003) in a static and closed economy set-up show106
that monetary policy should target ination in the sticky-price sector. The same result, in a dy-107
namic set-up, is found by Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004), respectively in a closed economy and108
a monetary union, and by Gali and Monacelli (2005) in an open economy. This nding suggests109
one should target domestic ination as it tends to be stickier than CPI ination. Regarding110
this literature, we also nd that domestic ination should be targeted, although this nding111
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depends on di¤erent factors. Specically, longer transmission lags necessary to a¤ect domestic112
ination versus CPI ination, larger exposure of CPI ination to foreign shocks, and structural113
parameters uncertainty that makes CPI ination more volatile than domestic ination.114
CPI ination has been also questioned as the ination measure to target considering eco-115
nomic indeterminacy (Batini, Levine and Pearlman 2005), and external price shocks (Eckstein116
and Segal 2010). Contrasting results, instead, emerge considering alternative producers price117
setting behaviors (Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2010), the elasticity of substitution between118
domestic and foreign goods (Sutherland, 2006), and the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-119
tion in consumption (De Paoli, 2009a, Kirsanova, Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2006). CPI ination120
seems, nally, preferable to domestic ination in presence of complete and immediate exchange121
rate pass-through (Svensson 2000), sticky wages (Campolmi 2014), or if imports are production122
inputs and not only used in nal consumption (Jakab and Karvalits 2009).123
With respect to the previous litterature, the novelty of this work is twofold. It frames124
the comparison between alternative ination measures within the ination forecast targeting125
operating procedure in use at many central banks, and accounts for parameter uncertainty.126
This innovation is carried out by comparing distribution forecasts associated with alternative127
ination targeting policies. We do so in three steps. First, we obtain distribution forecasts128
considering parameter uncertainty along with exogenous shocks. Then, we associate these129
distribution forecasts to alternative ination measure to stabilize by varying the weights of130
domestic and CPI ination in a standard loss function; this is consistent with the procedure131
indicated for example by Holmsen, Qvigstad, Røisland and Solberg-Johansen (2008) for the132
Bank of Norway. Finally, we compare the impact of alternative ination measure to stabilize133
on the distribution forecasts of the main macroeconomic variables using appropriate statistics.134
In this way, the paper contributes to the literature o¤ering a new standpoint, based on ination135
forecast targeting and parameter uncertainty -which is a formidable challenge to real-world136
monetary policy- for assessing the ability of DIT to help reducing macroeconomic volatility. It137
also departs from the previous literature suggesting an indirect link between the choice of the138
ination targeting policies and nancial stability, where interest rate volatility acts as a drive139
belt.140
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its calibration. Model141
simulations under the alternative ination targeting policies are reported and discussed in Sec-142
tion 3 where the role played by model parameter uncertainty in the policy assessment is also143
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analyzed. Section 4 relies on US, UK and Swedish data to show empirically that lower interest144
rate uncertainty has a benecial impact also on nancial stability. Section 5 concludes.145
2 The model146
The model adopts a New Keynesian framework drawing on Flamini (2007) and the methodology147
developed by Svensson and Williams (2007) to compute the optimal monetary policy when the148
central bank have limited information on the behaviour of the private sector3.149
Regarding the optimal policy, a standard approach employed in the literature consists of150
modeling central bank and private sector behavior with a quadratic loss function and linear151
aggregate demand and supply, respectively. This approach, in presence of additive exogenous152
shocks, leads to the well known Certainty Equivalence result: the same optimal policy with or153
without shocks. Thus, the model would generate mean forecasts for each variable in response154
to a shock, i.e. impulse response functions, rather than the much more useful distribution155
forecasts, i.e. impulse response distribution forecasts. The limitation is therefore clear: with156
mean forecasts, important information used in policy decisions consisting of the uncertainty157
associated with the forecast is lost. To avoid Certainty Equivalence and therefore obtain useful158
distribution forecasts, we relax the strong assumption usually held in the literature that central159
banks know with certainty the model of the economy. Thus, when an exogenous shock hits,160
several possible expected paths of the economy are possible, which result in a distribution161
forecast for each macroeconomic variables. To consider model parameter uncertainty, which has162
nature of multiplicative uncertainty, along with exogenous shocks, which instead have nature of163
additive uncertainty, the modeling strategy follows the Svensson and Williams (2007) approach164
based on Markov jump-linear-quadratic systems4.165
2.1 The household166
The economy is populated by a continuum of consumers/producers indexed by j 2 [0; 1] sharing167
the same preferences and living forever. The representative household seeks to maximize the168
expected value of an intertemporal utility of the form169
3This section reports a concise description of the model in order to allow a clear presentation of how model
uncertainty a¤ects the expected dynamics of the economy. Details on the derivation of the structural relations
can be found in Flamini (2007).
4An interesting application with respect to monetary policy under nancial uncertainty is provided by Williams
(2012).
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1X
=0
U
 
Ct+ ; Ct+ 1

; (1)
where  is the intertemporal discount factor, Ct is total consumption of household j; and Ct is170
the total aggregate consumption. Preferences over total consumption feature habit formation a171
laAbel (1990) captured by the following instantaneous utility function172
U
 
Ct+ ; Ct+ 1

=
 
Ct+= C

t+ 1
1  1

1  1
; (2)
where  > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and   0 captures habit persistence.173
Habit persistence determines the degree of backward and forward lookingness of the household,174
and therefore the degree of persistence in the aggregate demand. The previous literature o¤ered175
a wide range of estimations for habit persistence to which a wide range of aggregate demands176
corresponds. This range spans from a purely backward looking aggregate demand, where a177
change in the previous period output gap leads to the same change in the current period out-178
put gap, to completely forward looking aggregate demand, where the previous period output179
gap does not a¤ect the current period output gap5. Given the variety of proposed values for180
habit persistence, this work assumes that the central bank does not choose a specic value for181
this parameter but a range. In other words, the central bank is uncertain on the amount of182
persistence in the aggregate demand.183
Back to the model, total consumption, Ct; is a Cobb-Douglas function of domestic good184
consumption, Cdt ; and import good consumption, C
i
t ;185
Ct  Cd(1 w)t C
iw
t ; (3)
where w determines the steady state share of imported goods in total consumption and Cdt , C
i
t186
are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of continuum of di¤erentiated domestic goods and import goods187
(henceforth indexed with d and i respectively),188
Cht =
Z 
Cht (j)
1  1
#
dj
 1
1 #
; h = d; i;
where # > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two di¤erentiated goods and, for the189
5For a review of the previous literature on the calibration of habits formation see Leith, Moldovan and Rossi
(2009).
7
sake of simplicity, is the same in both sectors6. Finally, P c is the overall Dixit-Stiglitz price190
index for the minimum cost of a unit of Ct and is given by191
P ct =
P i
w
t P
d(1 w)
t
ww (1  w)(1 w)
; (4)
with P d; P i denoting, respectively, the Dixit-Stiglitz price index for goods produced in the192
domestic and import sector.193
Assuming a no-Ponzi schemes condition, utility maximization subject to the budget con-194
straint and the limit on borrowing gives the Euler equation and the Uncovered Interest Parity,195
which in terms of log deviations from steady state values are, respectively196
ct = ct 1 + (1  ) ct+1jt   (1  )

it   ct+1jt

;   t (1  )
1 + t (1  ) < 1; (5)
it   it = st+1jt   st + t; (6)
where for any variable x; the expression xt+ jt stands for the rational expectation of that vari-197
able in period t +  conditional on the information available in period t and, by means of a198
log-linearization, the variables ct, ct , it, i

t ,
 
st+1jt   st

and t are log-deviations from their199
respective constant steady state values; nally, ct denotes total aggregate consumption, ob-200
tained considering that in equilibrium total consumption for agent j is equal to total aggregate201
consumption, i.e. Ct = Ct; ct denotes CPI ination (measured as the log deviation of gross202
CPI ination from the constant CPI ination target), and t is a risk premium shock added to203
capture nancial market volatility and it is modeled with a stationary univariate AR(1) process204
t+1 = t + 

t+1:
6Following Corsetti and Pesenti (2004), the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and
import goods is set equal to one. This assumption ensures the stationarity of the model.
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2.1.1 Domestic consumption of goods produced in the domestic sector205
Preferences captured by equation (3) imply that the (log deviation of the) domestic demand for206
goods produced in the domestic sector, cdt ; is given by207
cdt = ct  

pdt   pct

;
which, considering the (log-linearized version of the) price index equation (4), can be rewritten208
as209
cdt = ct + wqt; (7)
where qt  pit   pdt is the (log-deviation of the) real exchange rate.210
Then, solving equation (5) for ct and combining it with equation (7) we obtain211
cdt =   (1  F1L) 1 t    (1  F1L) 1wqt + wqt; (8)
where F1 < 1 is the smaller root of the characteristic polynomial of equation (5) and212
t 
1X
=0

it+ jt   dt++1jt

(9)
can be interpreted as the long real interest rate.213
2.1.2 Aggregate demand for goods produced in the domestic sector214
Total aggregate demand for the good produced in the domestic sector is215
bY dt = Cdt + Y d;dt + Y d;it + Cdt ; (10)
where Y d;dt ; Y
d;i
t and C
d
t denote the quantity of the (composite) domestic good which is used216
as an input in the domestic sector, as an input in the import sector and which is demanded by217
the foreign sector, respectively.218
While both sectors feature a continuum of unit mass of rms, indexed by j; that produce219
di¤erentiated goods Y dt (j) and Y
i
t (j) in the domestic and import sector respectively, the two220
sectors di¤er for the input used: the domestic sector uses a composite input consisting of the221
domestic (composite) good itself and the (composite) import good provided by the import sector;222
the import sector uses a composite input consisting of the foreign good Y t and the domestic223
9
(composite good). Furthermore, to capture the real-world feature that production inputs tend224
to be rigid at business cycle frequency, sectors are assumed to use a Leontief technology. Thus,225
the production functions in the domestic and import sector are given respectively by226
Y dt (j) = f
"
Adt min
(
Y d;dt
1  ;
Y i;dt

)#
; Y it (j) = f
"
Aitmin
(
Y t
1  i ;
Y d;it
i
)#
; ; i 2 [0; 1]; (11)
where f is an increasing, concave, isoelastic function, At is an exogenous (sector specic)227
economy-wide productivity parameter, (1  ) and denote, respectively, the shares of the228
domestic good and import good in the composite input required to produce the di¤erentiated229
domestic good j; and
 
1  i and i denote, respectively, the shares of the foreign good and230
domestic good in the composite input required to provide the di¤erentiated import good j: Fo-231
cusing on i; it is worth of note that when this parameter is positive a change of the exchange232
rate does not fully reect in a change of the import goods price as the composite input consists233
also of the domestic good. In this case the exchange rate pass-through turns out to be incom-234
plete. It is well known that the exchange rate pass-through can be quite variable over time due235
to numerous factors playing a role in its determination. To model pass-through uncertainty,236
the parameter i is assumed to be uncertain7. Returning to the description of the technology,237
equation (11) implies that the quantities of the (composite) domestic good used as an input in238
the domestic and import sector are239
Y d;dt =
1
Adt
(1  ) f 1
bY dt  ; Y d;it = 1Aitif 1
bY it  ; (12)
where bY it denotes the demand of the import good. Finally, log-linearizing equation (10) around240
the steady state values yields241
bydt = 1  i cdt + 2  i byit + 3  i cdt ; (13)
where 01
 
i

; 03
 
i

< 0 and 02
 
i

> 0.242
7Campa and Goldberg (2006 and 2005) argue that changes in pass-through can be driven by changes in the use
of imported inputs or in the composition of a countrys import basket when the component products have distinct
pass-through elasticities. Futhermore, various authors (Devereux and Engel 2001, Devereux, Engel and Storgaard
2004) link the pass-through variability to changes in monetary stability and the persistence of exogenous shocks,
and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) to changes in the market share and in the degree of di¤erentiation of the
exporting country goods.
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Next, the output-gap in sector h = d; i is dened as243
yht  byht   yh;nt ;
where yh;nt denotes the log deviation of the natural output in sector h from its steady state244
value. As in Svensson (2000), both yh;nt and c
d
t are exogenous and follow, respectively245
yh;nt+1 = 
h;n
y y
h;n
t + 
h;n
t+1; 0  h;ny < 1; h = d; i; (14)
where h;nt+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean shock to the natural output level (a productivity246
shock), and247
cdt = 

yy

t + 
wqt; (15)
where 

y is the income elasticity of foreign real consumption and 
 and w denote, respectively,248
the foreign atemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and the share249
of domestic goods in foreign consumption. Finally, in line with the central banksview of the250
approximate one-period lag necessary to a¤ect aggregate demand, consumption decisions are251
assumed to be predetermined one period in advance. Accordingly, repeating the same derivation252
with preferences maximized on the basis of one period ahead information results in the aggregate253
demand in the domestic sector. This relation, expressed in terms of the output-gap, is given by254
ydt+1 = yy
d
t   t+1jt + qqt+1jt   q 1qt + yyt + ynyd;nt + dt+1   d;nt+1; (16)
where dt+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean demand shock. In (16) all the coe¢ cients are255
positive and functions of the structural parameters of the model. It is worth noting that, due256
to the uncertainty on habit persistence, it turns out that, for any period t; the coe¢ cients for257
the previous period output gap, real exchange rate, foreign output, and natural output in the258
domestic sector, y, q 1 ; y , yn respectively, are uncertain.259
2.1.3 Aggregate demand of goods produced in the import sector260
Aggregate demand for import goods is given by261
bY it = Cit + Y i;dt (17)
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where Y i;dt denotes the amount of the import good used as an input in the domestic sector.262
Log-linearizing (17) around the steady state results in263
byit = (1  e) cit + ebydt : (18)
Finally, the same assumptions used to derive the aggregate demand for the domestic sector264
goods yield265
yit+1 = yy
i
t   it+1jt   iqqt+1jt + iq 1qt + iyyt + iynyi;nt + it+1   i;nt+1; (19)
where all the coe¢ cients are positive and depend on the structural parameters of the model,266
it+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean demand shock, and the coe¢ cients y, 
i
q 1 ; 
i
y , 
i
yn267
are uncertain.268
2.1.4 Aggregate supply in the domestic sector269
We now assume that rm j takes270
Y dt (j) = bY dt P dt (j)P dt
 #
as the demand for its own variety, where P dt (j) is the nominal price for variety j. Since the
composite input is a convex combination of both aggregates of domestic and import goods, as
shown by equation (11), it follows that the input price is Wt  (1  )P dt + P it : Furthermore,
adopting the Calvo (1983) staggered price scheme, the rm chooses in any period the new
price with probability (1  ) or keeps the previous period price indexed to past ination with
probability : The parameter  determines the degree of price stickiness and exerts a major
impact on the slope of the Phillips curve, that is the response of ination to uctuations in
resource utilization. This relation seemed to have varied in the last two decades possibly due
to an anchoring of ination expectations via better monetary policy (Mishkin 2007, Boivin and
Giannoni 2006, and Roberts 2006), or due to changes in the price-setting behaviour dependent
on the level and variability of ination (among the others, Cogley and Sbordone 2005 and
Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez 2007). To account for this uncertainty on the slope of
the Phillips curve, the parameter  is assumed to be uncertain. Finally, we assume that when
the rm can choose the optimal price, it chooses it two periods in advance. This assumption is
12
motivated by the fact that domestic sector rms take both production and retailing decisions.
The implication is that monetary policy needs a two-period lag to a¤ect domestic ination. This
is in line with the central banksexperience of an approximate two-period lag for monetary policy
to have the highest impact on ination. Recalling that all the varieties are produced with the
same technology, there is a unique input requirement function for each j given by 1
Adt
f 1

Y dt (j)

and the variable cost of producing the quantity Y dt (j) is Wt
1
Adt
f 1

Y dt (j)

: It follows that the
decision problem for rm j at time t is
maxeP dt+2 Et
1X
=0
edt++2
8>>>><>>>>:
eP dt+2P dt++1P dt+1

P dt+2+
bY dt++2
26664
eP dt+2P dt++1P dt+1

P dt+2+
37775
 #
(20)
 Wt++2
P dt++2
f 1
2664bY dt++2
0B@ eP dt+2

Pdt++1
Pdt+1

P dt+2+
1CA
 #3775
Adt++2
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
;
where edt ; eP dt+2 and  denote, respectively, the marginal utility of domestic goods, the new price271
chosen in period t for period t+2 and the degree of indexation to the previous period ination272
rate8. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003), the273
parameter  introduces ination inertia in the Calvo model of pricesetting. Empirical evidence274
on  is characterized by contrasting results as reported by Kimura and Kurozumi (2007). It275
is therefore di¢ cult to pin down a value for  and the paper proceeds by assuming that this276
parameter belongs to the set of the uncertain parameters.277
Finally, following Svensson (2000), we set  = 1 to ensure the natural-rate hypothesis and
assuming that the purchasing power parity holds in the long run, the log-linearized version of
8Recalling that consumption decisions are predetermined one period in advance, the marginal utility of do-
mestic goods edt is obtained by the following rst-order condition with respect to Cdt+1
EtUd

Cdt+1; C
i
t+1

= Et
h
t+1P
d
t+1
i
 Etedt+1;
where t is the marginal utility of nominal income in period t:
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the Phillips curve for the domestic sector turns out to be
dt+2 =
1
1 + 
"
dt+1 + 
d
t+3jt +
(1  )2
 (1 + !#)

!ydt+2jt + qt+2jt
#
+ "t+2 (21)
= 
d
t+1 + (1  )dt+3jt + dyydt+2jt + dqqt+2jt + "t+2; (22)
where ! in (21) is the output elasticity of the marginal input requirement function and "t+2 is a278
zero-mean i.i.d. cost-push shock. In (22) all the implicitly dened coe¢ cients are positive and279
dy and 
d
q are uncertain due to the uncertainty on  and .280
2.1.5 Aggregate supply in the import sector281
In the import sector, the input is a convex combination of the aggregate of domestic goods and282
of the foreign good, with price P t St; where P t is the price in foreign currency of the foreign283
good. It follows that the price of the composite input is Ft  iP dt +
 
1  iP t St.284
Now, relaxing the assumption that pricing decisions are predetermined and keeping all the
remaining assumptions used to derive the Phillips curve in the domestic sector results in
it =
1
1 + 
"
it 1 + 
i
t+1jt +
 
1  i2
i (1 + !#)
 
!yit + q
i
t
#
(23)
= 
i
t 1 + (1  )it+1jt + iyyit + iqqit; (24)
where i is the probability of not updating optimally the price in the import sector and is285
assumed to be uncertain, qit denotes (the log deviation of) the price of the composite input in286
the import sector expressed in terms of the import goods price, pit; and is dened as287
qit 
 
1  i (st + pt ) + ipdt   pit; (25)
where pt is the (log) foreign price level. Relaxing the assumption of predetermined pricing288
decisions is motivated by the fact that the import sector only acts as a retailer for the foreign289
goods and, in practice, retailers do not set their price before they take e¤ect as much as producers290
do. It is worthy of note that while i determines the degree of completeness of the pass-through291
as discussed before, i determines the speed of the pass-through. Hence, uncertainty on i and292
i captures two dimensions of the uncertainty on the exchange rate pass-through.293
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2.2 CPI ination and the uncovered interest parity294
CPI-ination, ct ; is given by295
ct = (1  w)dt + wit; (26)
where w is the steady state share of imported goods in total consumption and determines the296
degree of openness of the economy. In order to eliminate the non-stationary nominal exchange297
rate, it is convenient to express the Uncovered Interest Parity in terms of qit obtaining298
qit+1jt   qit =
 
1  i rt    1  i it   t+1jt  it+1jt   dt+1jt   1  i t; (27)
where rt is the short term real interest rate dened as rt  it   dt+1jt:299
2.3 Central bank, rest of the world, and deep parameter uncertainty300
The behavior of the central bank consists of minimizing the following loss function:301
Et
1X
=0

h
cc2t+ + 
dd2t+ + y
d2
t+ +  (it+   it+ 1)2
i
; (28)
where c; d;  and  are weights that express the preferences of the central bank for alternative302
CPI and domestic ination targets along with the output stabilization target, and the instrument303
smoothing target, respectively9.304
It is worth noticing that in the New Keynesian literature on optimal monetary policy the305
central bank preferences are modeled either directly in terms of volatility for ination, output306
gap and rst di¤erence of the interest rate, or in terms of a quadratic approximation of the307
utility function of the household10.308
The rst way bears the advantage to be operational. Indeed, in contrast with a loss function309
that approximates the utility of the representative consumer, it does not depend on the spe-310
cic assumptions of the model (e.g. household preferences, ination inertia, habit persistence,311
predetermined pricing decisions) which would imply xed weights in the loss functions.312
For this reason it is consistent with the ination forecast targeting operating procedure313
adopted in several central banks as, for example, the Bank of England, Swedens Riksbank,314
Norways Norges Bank, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Describing this procedure, rst315
9Regarding the motivation for an interest rate smoothing preferences in the Central Bank loss function see,
for example, Svensson (2010), Holmsen et al. (2008), and Flamini and Fracasso (2011).
10See for example Svensson (2000, 2010) for the former and Corsetti et al. (2010) for the latter.
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the sta¤ computes alternative distribution forecasts associated with di¤erent interest rate paths316
minimizing a standard loss function of the type of expression (28). These optimal distribution317
forecasts are constructed by varying the weights and/or the discount factor in the central bank318
loss function. Then the Board selects the policy associated with the specic distribution fore-319
cast that suits best its preferences. Holmsen, Qvigstad, Røisland and Solberg-Johansen (2008)320
describe accurately this operating procedure and add at p. 22 that From the point of view321
of the sta¤, the loss function and its relative weights are meant to represent the preferences of322
the Board. This is in contrast to much of the recent monetary policy literature, where the loss323
function approximates the utility loss of the representative consumer.324
The rest of the world is exogenous and described by stationary univariate AR(1) processes
for foreign ination and income, and a Taylor rule for monetary policy, respectively
t+1 = 



t + "

t+1; (29)
yt+1 = 

yy

t + 

t+1; (30)
it = f



t + f

y y

t + 

t ; (31)
where the shocks are white noises.325
Turning to the presence of uncertainty on some structural parameters, it is worth noting326
that it introduces multiplicative uncertainty in the model. This implies that the certainty-327
equivalence principle does not hold anymore and the optimal policy in presence of uncertainty328
di¤ers from the one in presence of certainty. To model multiplicative uncertainty and compute329
the equilibrium we follow the Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic approach developed by Svensson330
and Williams (2007). Leaving to the Appendix the description of this method, we specify here331
the assumptions on the parameter uncertainty faced by the central bank. First, the central332
bank only knows a band for each uncertain deep parameter and considers any realization as333
equally likely. For example, if there is only one uncertain parameter, say '; a benchmark value334
is chosen, '; and the lower and upper bound of the support of the distribution are set equal to335
' x' and '+x' respectively, where the coe¢ cient x modules the variance of the distribution336
and therefore the amount of uncertainty. Second, model parameter uncertainty and shocks to337
the economy are assumed to be independent. Third, the central bank is assumed not to know338
how the structural parameters co-move together, should they be dependent.339
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2.4 Calibration340
Solving the model requires the calibration of two groups of parameters. The rst consists of the341
parameters that are assumed to be known with certainty, while the second one consists of the342
benchmark values for the uncertain parameters11.343
The choice of the parameters assumed to be known with certainty follows Svensson (2000) as344
the current model is similar in structure to the Svenssons one. These parameters, with respect345
to the domestic economy, are the output elasticity of the marginal input requirement function,346
! = 0:8; the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same type of good # = 1:25; the347
intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  = 0:5; the share of import good in the composite input348
to produce the domestic good,  = 0:1; the share of import goods in domestic consumption,349
w = 0:3. With respect to the foreign sector, the elasticity of substitution between domestic350
and import goods for foreign consumers is  = 2; the share of the domestic good in foreign351
consumption is w = 0:15; the income elasticity of foreign real consumption is y = 0:9; and the352
coe¢ cients for the foreign Taylor rule are f = 1:5, and fy = 0:5: Finally, the exogenous cost353
push and demand shocks have variances 2 = 
2
y = 1; the natural output shocks have variances354
2
yd;n
= 2
yi;n
= 0:5 and AR(1)-parameter d;ny = 
i;n
y = 0:96; and nally the risk premium,355
foreign ination and output have AR(1) process-parameter y =  =  = 0:8 and variances356
2 = 
2
 = 
2
y = 0:5: As to the central bank preferences, the weights in the loss function under357
DIT and CPIIT are, respectively, d = 1; c = 0 and  = 0:5; and d = 0; c = 1 and  = 0:5:358
The benchmark values of the uncertain parameters follow Banerjee and Batini (2003) as to359
the measure of habit formation in the utility function,  = 0:8 and Smets and Wouters (2005)360
as to the degree of indexation to the previous period ination rate,  = 0:66. The probability361
on not optimally updating the price in the current period in the domestic and import sector, ;362
and i, are set equal to 0:5 following Svensson (2000) and Flamini (2007), respectively. Finally,363
the value of the share of domestic good in the composite input to supply the import good, i,364
is set to 0:35 consistently with Flamini (2007) and such that the lower and upper bound of the365
support of the i distribution are realistic for the uncertainty level considered in the analysis;366
specically the lower and upper bounds are 0:245 and 0:405:367
11 In this paper we assume that the central bank is uncertain on some key parameters. This does not mean
that the true value of the remaining parameters is known in the real world and corresponds to the value specied
in the calibration suggested by the previous literature. Nevertheless, this is a problem of the literature at large
and is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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2.4.1 Robustness check368
The current model is also similar in spirit to the Leitemo and Söderström (2005) model. Al-369
though the latter is not microfounded, its parametrization for the exogenous disturbances370
provides a valid alternative to check for the robustness of the results. In the Leitemo and371
Söderström model, the cost-push shock and the demand shock are AR(1) processes and their372
AR(1)-coe¢ cients,  and y; are set equal to 0.3 (this is a di¤erence with the previous cali-373
bration where the AR(1)-coe¢ cients for these two shocks are implicitly set equal to zero). The374
variances for these shocks are 2y = 0:656 and 
2
 = 0:389; while the variance for the shocks to375
the risk premium, foreign ination, and foreign output gap are 2 = 0:844; 
2
 = 0:022; and376
2y = 0:083; respectively
12. For the risk premium AR(1)-coe¢ cient , Leitemo and Söderström377
considers the interval [0; 1] : In the current analysis, having to choose one value,  is set equal378
to 0:5:379
To recap, all the parameters known with certainty and associated with the Svensson (2000)380
and the Leitemo and Söderström (2005) calibrations are reported, respectively in Panels a and381
b of Table 1, while the benchmark values of the uncertain parameters are reported in Table 2.382
3 Macroeconomic volatility under DIT and CPIIT383
Parameter uncertainty poses a major challenge to real world monetary policy. In this work,384
the consideration of model parameter uncertainty is what allows moving from mean forecast385
targeting to distribution forecast targeting. The latter means that, given a specic policy, e.g.386
DIT or CPIIT, and given an exogenous disturbance, the solution of the optimization problem387
implies a correspondence that associates any point in time with a distribution forecast for each388
variable. This information richness is lost with mean forecasts targeting. In this case, due to389
the certainty equivalence principle, the optimal policy response to an exogenous shock implies a390
function that associates any point in time with, exactly, one value for each variable. Thus, the391
relevance of accounting for model parameter uncertainty lies in shedding light on the expected392
volatility of the variables at any current and future point in time. This, for policymakers, is a393
key aspect of the economic outlook and is normally assessed in policy decisions via the ination394
forecast targeting operating procedure.395
12Leitemo and Roisland (2002) nd these variances with a structural VAR on the Norwegian economy.
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3.1 Distribution forecasts to a cost-push shock in presence of general uncer-396
tainty397
The analysis starts with the unconditional distribution forecasts of the impulse responses to a398
(one standard deviation) cost-push shock reported in Figures 1-2. The distribution forecasts are399
generated assuming general uncertainty, which encompasses uncertainty on the pass-through,400 
ij ; 
i
j

; on the persistence in the private sectors behaviour, (j ; j) ; and on the slope of401
the domestic AS, (j). In each gure, the rst and second column report the distribution402
forecasts of the main macroeconomic variables under the optimal policies of domestic and CPIIT403
respectively13. Assuming an uncertainty level of 30% on all the uncertain parameters, Figures404
1-2 have been generated by drawing an initial mode of the Markov chain from its stationary405
distribution, simulating the chain for a sequence of periods forward, and then repeating this406
procedure for 1000 simulations runs14. Thus these gures display mean (dashed line), and407
quantiles (grey bands), of the empirical distribution. In particular, the dark, medium and light408
grey band show the 30%, 60%, and 90% probability bands, respectively. Figures 1-2 consider,409
respectively, high and low central bank preferences for smoothing the interest rate path15.410
Strong attention on smoothing the interest rate implies a mild monetary policy where there is411
almost no attempt to bu¤er the shock. This case is interesting as starts to reveal the impact of412
model parameter uncertainty and alternative ination indexes on the distribution forecasts; it413
thus provides a benchmark. In the latter case, low preferences for interest rate smoothing, the414
monetary policy is more realistic and the di¤erent impact of model parameter uncertainty on415
the distribution forecasts linked to alternative target ination indexes is fully revealed.416
Figure 1 features a high preference for interest rate smoothing. Here, visual inspection shows417
that the volatility of the macroeconomic variables distribution tends to be higher under CPIIT.418
In Figure 2, switching to a low preference for interest rate smoothing, and therefore to a more419
active policy, the previous result is strongly amplied: DIT implies much less volatility of the420
projections of the economy, in particular of the interest rates, and a surprisingly better ability421
to absorb the cost-push shock. Focusing on the interest rate in the more realistic case portrayed422
by Figure 2, monetary policy with DIT is expected to be tighter than neutral in the initial ve423
periods to get back to neutral afterwards. In contrast, with CPIIT, the distribution forecast424
13Although this paper focus on the expected interest rate volatility associated with alternative ination tar-
geting policies, it is informative to investigate also the volatility of the other macroeconomic variables.
14The results presented in this and the next sections are robust to smaller and larger uncertainty levels.
15Specically, the interest rate smoothing preferences parameter, ; in the loss function (28), is 0:05 in Figure
1 and 0:002 in Figure 2.
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allows anticipating the type of policy only in the rst two periods leaving policymakers in the425
darkness in the subsequent periods. Indeed, with respect to the distribution forecast associated426
with DIT, the one associated with CPIIT signals a policy expected to be even tighter than427
neutral in the rst two periods, but then provides no guidance of anticipation in terms of428
whether it will tighten or ease afterwards.429
Furthermore, it is worth noting a sharp increase in the interest rate in the rst two periods430
under CPIIT which will be discussed in Section 4 with reference to the possible implications of431
interest rate uncertainty on nancial instability.432
Summing up, these ndings suggest the following: rst, bu¤ering a cost-push shock under433
DIT leads to less volatility in the distribution forecasts than under CPIIT, in particular for the434
interest rate. Second, with CPIIT it is much more di¢ cult to forecast the interest rate path435
after the initial periods. Third, if the central bank is called to set a less smooth interest rate436
path, that is, a more active policy, then CPIIT leads to much more expected volatility in the437
economic outlook than DIT.438
These ndings also suggest important potential implications for nancial stability because439
market rates and asset prices are related to the behavior of the o¢ cial rate analyzed here. Before440
discussing these implications and investigating empirically the relation between interest rate441
uncertainty and nancial stability, which will be the subject matter of section 4, we introduce442
some statistics to deepen the analysis of the interest rate volatility in presence of a cost-push443
shock. Then we extend the analysis to other macroeconomic variables and shocks in order to444
gain a general outlook associated with the alternative targeting policies.445
3.2 Measuring the volatility of i in presence of a cost-push shock446
On the basis of the previous analysis with high and low interest smoothing preferences, a natural447
question to ask is whether the volatility of the macroeconomic variables is monotonous in the448
preferences for smoothing. This is relevant given the uncertainty on the smoothing preferences449
of the central bank and, more in general, the time varying degree of activism in monetary policy450
possibly related to central bank judgment. To address this question, Figure 3 focuses on the451
cost-push shock case and presents the standard deviation of the distribution forecasts of the452
nominal interest rate for the periods considered above and for interest rate smoothing values453
in the set V = f0:002; 0:005; :::; 0:04g16. Explaining this gure, each sub plot reports two454
16Section 3.3 will extend the analysis to other macroeconomic variables and shocks.
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surfaces that describe the standard deviation of the distribution forecasts under CPI and DIT.455
The uncertainty cases considered are uncertainty (i) on the pass-through, (ii) on the persistence456
of the behaviour of households and rms, (iii) on the degree of price exibility in the domestic457
sector (AS slope uncertainty), and (iv) on all the previous sources, i.e. general uncertainty.458
A rst result is that either the CPIIT surface is always above the DIT surface (in the459
uncertainty on the pass-through, on the persistence in the behaviour of households and rms,460
and general uncertainty cases, rst, second, and forth column respectively), or the two surfaces461
tend to overlap with the DIT one slightly above the CPI one for small preferences on interest rate462
smoothing (in the cases of uncertainty on the slope of the Phillips curve in the domestic sector,463
third column). This shows that under the pass-through, persistence, and general uncertainty464
cases the CPIIT policy results systematically in a larger standard deviation for the interest rate465
distribution forecast than DIT. Instead, when we consider the case of uncertainty on the degree466
of price exibility in the domestic sector, the standard deviation associated with DIT tends to467
be higher than the one associated with CPIIT.468
Second, the volatility of the distribution forecasts of the interest rate tend to be monoton-469
ically increasing in the preference for not smoothing the interest rate. Yet, it is interesting to470
note that, decreasing interest rate smoothing, the volatility under CPIIT tends to increase more471
than under DIT.472
These ndings are relevant as they generalize to a broad set of interest rate smoothing473
preferences the previous ndings reported in Figures 1-2: DIT leads to less variability of the474
distribution forecasts of the interest rate in the presence of a cost-push shock, and it is less475
sensitive to interest rate smoothing.476
In order to quantitatively compare the volatility of the distribution forecasts associated with477
the two policies it is informative to compute the ratio of the means (along all the smoothing478
preferences values and the periods considered) of the standard deviations in the two policy479
cases, i.e.480
R  mean

;tstd
c
;t (variable)
mean

;tstdd;t (variable)
;
where stdh;t (variable) ; h = c; d; denote the standard deviation of the distribution forecast of481
the considered variable for period t, and smoothing preferences value ; and c and d denote CPI482
and DIT, respectively. Table 3 presents the statistic R for various uncertainty types.483
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE484
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This analysis shows that in almost all uncertainty cases, DIT dominates CPIIT. Further-485
more, when we focus on the more representative case of general uncertainty, which includes all486
the previous cases, the mean of the standard deviation under CPIIT is 2.79 times larger than487
under DIT.488
3.3 Targeting policies and macroeconomic volatility: the overall economic489
outlook490
Do the earlier results associated with the R statistic hold for the other variables and external491
disturbances? It is worth asking this question as the willingness to follow a targeting policy492
favoring interest rate predictability might be related to other shocks and considerations on the493
predictability of other macroeconomic variables. Interestingly, this section shows that earlier494
ndings tend to hold to a remarkable extent in a more general setting. Considering CPI and495
domestic ination, c and d respectively, the short term real interest rate, r; and the real496
exchange rate, q; along with the additional (one standard deviation) shocks to the aggregate497
demand, the foreign interest rate, the natural output, the risk premium, and the foreign output,498
Tables 4-5 report the R ratio for the general uncertainty case.499
INSERT TABLES 4-5 HERE500
To discuss the results associated with the ratio R it is useful to dene alternative dominance501
intervals around the no-dominance point, i.e. R = 1:We thus select intervals endpoints starting502
from the case in which one policy performs outstandingly better than the other. We let this503
case be the one in which a policy leads to a volatility at most half as large as the other policy504
volatility and call it "Strong Dominance". As a result, Strong Dominance cuto¤ values are 0:5505
and 2 and the related intervals are (0; 0:5] and [2;1): Next, we consider the opposite case, i.e.506
when policies do not perform in a signicantly di¤erent way. This case is useful to identify and507
lter out close calls, i.e. similar performances potentially di¢ cult to make a decision about. We508
let this case be the one in which a policy leads to a volatility at least nine tenth as large as but509
smaller than the other and call it Weak Dominance17. It follows that the Weak Dominance510
cuto¤ values are 0:9 and 1:1; and the related intervals are [0:9; 1) and (1; 1:1]:511
17Although the choice of the 9/10 cuto¤ is a priori not unreasonable, less conservative cuto¤ values would not
change the line of the results.
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This denition of Strong and Weak Dominance implicitly delimits an in-between space where512
one policy performs signicantly, but not outstandingly, better than the other. This is the case513
in which one policy leads to a volatility more than half and less than nine tenth as large as the514
other. We call this the "Dominance" case and it consists of the intervals (0:5; 0:9) and (1:1; 2):515
To recap, the alternative dominance intervals are516
Strong Dominance () 0 < R  0:5 or R  2
Dominance () 0:5 < R < 0:9 or 1:1 < R < 2
Weak Dominance () 0:9  R < 1 or 1 < R  1:1
Turning to the results, Tables 4 describes the performance of the two policies under the Svensson517
(2000) calibration. Abstracting from the weak dominance cases, DIT is strongly dominant or518
dominant in 44.4% of the cases, while it is dominated in 27.7% of the cases18. Interestingly, DIT519
strongly dominates in approximately one fth of the cases, yet it is never strongly dominated.520
Checking for the robustness of these results, the analysis based on the Leitemo and Söderström521
(2005) calibration corroborates the previous ndings. Indeed, results in Table 5 show that DIT522
is strongly dominant or dominant in the 63.8% while it is dominated in the 16.6% of the cases.523
It is worth noting that the cases in which DIT is dominated tend to pertain to CPI ination,524
as we would expect, and also to the real exchange rate. As to the former, except for the cost-525
push shock, both the distribution forecasts of domestic and CPI ination are not very sensitive526
to exogenous disturbances. Thus the two policies tend to be similar in their ability to stabilize527
ination even if each one is better at stabilizing its own measure of ination19. As to the latter,528
the real exchange rate, with a demand, natural output, risk premium, and foreign output shock,529
CPIIT performs better as is shown in Table 4-5. This is due to the fact that it aims to stabilize530
both domestic and import ination, which determine the real exchange rate.531
Shocks to the risk premium, foreign interest rate and foreign output gap deserve a nal532
comment. In these cases the shocks impact on the nominal exchange rate via the uncovered533
interest parity. Then, if the central bank does not react, the shock propagates to CPI ination.534
Thus, with CPIIT the central bank has to respond to these shocks. Yet, the central bank may535
not be willing to react to shocks that a¤ect the nominal exchange rate. Leitemo and Söderström536
(2005) maintain that it should not. Their argument is that there is uncertainty about how the537
18DIT is strongly dominant in 8 cases, dominant in 8 cases, weakly dominant in 4 cases, weakly dominated in
6 cases, dominated in 10 cases, and strongly dominated in 0 cases.
19The impulse response distribution forecasts for the complete set of shocks are available upon request.
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exchange rate is determined and the e¤ect of exchange rate movements on the economy. This538
implies that rules with the exchange rate are more sensitive to model uncertainty. Thus, a539
monetary policy developed in the context of an exchange rate model could perform poorly if540
that model is incorrect. Empirical evidence in this respect seems to favor no policy reaction to541
the nominal exchange rate. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) nd that Australia and New Zealand542
did not react to movements in the exchange rate while Canada and the UK did. Also considering543
optimal policy and parameter uncertainty, Justiniano and Preston (2010) nd that Australia,544
Canada and New Zealand do not respond to the exchange rate.545
Describing the mechanism that generates the papers results, two factors stand out: more546
policy activism under CPIIT than under DIT and the presence of model parameter uncertainty.547
The rst factor is shown in Figures 4-5 computed assuming no model parameter uncertainty.548
These gures displays the impulse response function of the nominal interest rate to a cost-push549
shock under the two alternative policies for high and low smoothing preferences, Figure 4 and550
5 respectively. Measuring monetary policy activism by the volatility (in terms of std) of the551
impulse response function around its long run value, under CPIIT this volatility is 1.3 times552
larger than under DIT when  = 0:05; and 4.53 times larger when  = 0:002.553
More policy activism under CPIIT than under DIT is due to i. di¤erent lags in the trans-554
mission of the policy action to CPI and domestic ination, and ii. to a larger exposure of CPI555
ination to foreign shocks. Di¤erent lags arise as the pricing decisions for domestic rms embed556
not only retailing decisions but production decisions too, and therefore are more subject to in-557
formation delays. It follows a longer lag for policy action to a¤ect domestic ination than CPI558
ination via the output gap. This is the policy transmission that occurs through the aggregate559
demand channel and the switching demand exchange rate channel. It follows also that shocks to560
the exchange rate and the price of the foreign goods in foreign currency a¤ect domestic ination561
with a lag via qt in the AS for the domestic sector, while they a¤ect directly import ination562
via qit in the AS for the import sector
20.563
Furthermore, more policy activism depends on a larger exposure of CPI ination to foreign564
shocks. Indeed, via the uncovered interest parity, the latter causes exchange rate volatility565
exerting a stronger impact on CPI ination than on domestic ination because import sector566
inputs are more intensive in foreign goods than domestic sector inputs. As a result, under CPIIT567
the central bank is more solicited to intervene in order to prevent exchange rate volatility from568
20The impact of the exchange rate on the domestic price of the foreign good is amply documented in the
literature and usually referred to as the Direct Exchange Rate channel.
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leading to too much CPI ination volatility. Hence, CPIIT implies a more pronounced trade-o¤569
between CPI ination and interest rate volatility.570
What happens when more policy activism is associated with the consideration of model pa-571
rameter uncertainty in the design of the optimal monetary policy? When parameter uncertainty572
is taken into account we move from one expected path for the interest rate (Figures 4-5) to a573
set of expected paths, which form the distribution forecast for the interest rate (third row in574
Figures 1-2). At this point, the degree of policy activism expands the width of the distribution575
forecast. Indeed, the larger the initial monetary policy stimulus, the more the uncertainty on576
the private sector behavior can lead to future changes in the policy.577
Finally, a wider distribution forecast for the interest rate results in wider distribution fore-578
casts for most of the other macroeconomic variables, which is the result shown in Figure 1-2579
and reported, more generally, in Tables 4-5.580
4 Interest rate volatility and nancial stability581
Our theoretical results suggest that the choice of the ination targeting policy, specically DIT,582
can reduce interest rate uncertainty. Since the interest rate is a key variable both for the583
real and the nancial sector of the economy, we argue that interest rate volatility can favour584
nancial instability. Interestingly, nancial instability, in turn, can feedback to the transmission585
mechanism of monetary policy (Baum et al., 2013).586
To start, we note that sharp increases in interest rates strain nancial markets, as it occurred587
for example in 1994 in the US. In this respect, the spike in the o¢ cial rate reported in Figure588
2 under CPIIT in the rst two periods suggests that this reaction to a cost-push shock is likely589
to add to nancial instability.590
We then draw on macroeconomic theory, in particular on the transmission mechanism of591
monetary policy. Indeed, changes in the o¢ cial rate set by the central bank, along with changes592
in the expectations concerning future o¢ cial rates, directly impact on market rates and asset593
prices. Short-term market rates follow the current and expected o¢ cial rates, although neither594
automatically nor exactly of the same amount. With respect to securities, other things equal,595
higher short-term interest rates lower equities prices. Further, expected short-term interest596
rates determine the long-term interest rate, which is inversely related to the price of bonds.597
Hence, the larger the volatility featured by the interest rate distribution forecast, the larger the598
volatility on market rates and asset prices. The volatility of these variables, in turn, a¤ects599
25
nancial instability. Regarding the US for example, Nelson and Perli (2005) develop a nancial600
fragility index based on the volatility of several assets including options on Eurodollar. The601
inclusion of this variable is interesting in that the implied volatility calculated from these options602
provide a measure of the expected volatility of very short-term rates, which are strictly related603
to the o¢ cial rate.604
Although we have not introduced a formal theoretical model linking nancial instability to605
interest rate uncertainty along the lines discussed in the theoretical section, we now provide606
some preliminary empirical evidence using US, UK and Swedish monthly data since the early607
1990s (our sample choice is dictated by the availability of data; data ends in 2013:M3 for the608
US, in 2013:M1 for Sweden and in 2011:M12 for the UK). Our empirical results reported in this609
section are by no means denitive; what we do is provide some initial evidence that such an610
impact does exist.611
Thus, we do not claim, at this stage, any methodological advances. Certainly it is possible to612
build a model that theoretically explores the conjectured relation between nancial instability613
and interest rate uncertainty. However, we believe that the model we use, along with the614
empirical evidence provided in this section, can serve as a useful baseline for policymakers615
to consider, in a broader perspective, the targeting policy choices in an era characterized by616
increasing nancial instability.617
To x ideas, Figure 6 plots the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Financial Stress Index618
(FSI) together with the e¤ective federal funds rate. The index, provided by the website of the619
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, pools information from 11 nancial variables (see Hakkio and620
Keeton, 2009) and is available from 1990 onwards21. An increase in the index denotes more621
nancial stress/instability. Figure 7 plots the Bank of Englands base rate together with the UK622
FSI compiled by the International Monetary Fund (see Balakrishnan et al, 2009); this measure623
provides a broad spectrum measure of stress across money, foreign exchange and equity markets624
in the UK (we have data for the index until the end of 2011). We note that both measures625
of nancial stress follow a similar pattern. They rise during the Russian debt default of 1998626
and the dot-com crash of 2000; they also rise sharply in 2007-2009. We also note that UKs627
FSI index is high in late 1992 following the exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism628
21The Kansas index is a composite index of the 3-month LIBOR/T-Bill spread, the 2-year swap spread, the
Aaa/10-year Treasury spread, the Baa/Aaa spread, the o¤-the-run/on-the-run 10-year Treasury spread, the high-
yield bond/Baa spread, the consumer Asset-Backed Securities/5-year Treasury spread, the correlation between
returns on stocks and Treasury bonds, the implied volatility of overall stock prices (VIX), the idiosyncratic
volatility of bank stock prices and the cross-section dispersion of bank stock returns.
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(ERM). Figure 8 plots the policy (repo) rate of the Swedish Central Bank (Sveriges Riksbank)629
together with the Financial Stress Index provided by the website of Sveriges Riksbank. The630
index is a composite index of the stock market, the bond market, the money market and the631
foreign exchange market (Johansson and Bonthron, 2013). The correlation amongst the three632
FSI measures is high (0.75 between the US and Swedish measures, 0.76 between the US and UK633
measures and 0.80 between the UK and Swedish measures). Figures 6-8 also plot our GARCH634
measures of interest rate uncertainty (reported in the text below). We note that uncertainty is635
high following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the dot-com bubble and during the recent nancial636
crisis.637
To test the impact of interest rate uncertainty on nancial instability we rely on a simple638
Auto Regressive (AR) model of the FSI index augmented by measures of interest rate uncer-639
tainty (it); the rst one is a 2-year Moving standard deviation of the interest rate, whereas the640
second measure derives from a simple GARCH(1,1) type of model of the interest rate22.641
Table 6 reports the empirical impact of interest rate uncertainty on nancial instability using642
US, UK and Swedish data.643
The results reveal strong persistency in the FSI. Increased interest rate uncertainty increases644
nancial instability (for Sweden the impact is signicant only based on the GARCH-type mea-645
sure of interest rate uncertainty). For all countries, the GARCH type of proxy of interest rate646
uncertainty ts the data best as it delivers a lower regression standard error and a lower Akaike647
Information Criterion (AIC)23.648
The short-run impacts of interest rate uncertainty on FSI are given by the it coe¢ cients649
reported in Table 6. For the US, the long-run impacts are given by 0.043/(1-0.97)=1.433, and650
0.360/(1-0.971)=12.41, respectively, for the 2-year Moving standard deviation and the GARCH651
22For the US, we estimate a GARCH(1,1) model of the form
it = 0 + 1it 1 + 2it 2 + 3it 3 + "t
where
2"t = 0 + 1"
2
t 1 + 2
2
"t 1
and it is the interest rate. We estimate 0 = 0:020 (0:010), 1 = 1:402(0:030), 2 =  0:272(0:060), 3 =
 0:150(0:039), 0 = 0:002(0:001), 1 = 0:363(0:030) and 2 = 0:724(0:017), where numbers in brackets are
standard errors. For the UK, we estimate a GARCH(1,1) model of the form
it = 0 + 1it 1 + 2it 2 + "t
where 2"t = 0 + 1"
2
t 1 + 2
2
"t 1 . We estimate 0 = 0:017(0:037), 1 = 1:460(0:050), 2 =  0:480(0:048), 0 =
0:001(0:001); 1 = 0:142(0:015) and 2 = 0:887(0:008), where numbers in brackets are standard errors. For
Sweden, we estimate an ARCH(1) model of the form it = 0+1it 1+2it 2+3it 3+"t, where 2"t = 0+1"
2
t 1.
We estimate 0 = 0:025(0:010); 1 = 1:530(0:080); 2 =  0:350(0:140); 3 =  0:200(0:059); 0 = 0:010(0:001)
and 1 = 0:460(0:130).
23For all countries, we also used the 1 and 3-year Moving standard deviation measures of interest rate uncer-
tainty. Results are qualitatively similar.
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type measure. For the UK, the long-run impacts are given by 0.187/(1-0.976)=7.791, and652
1.156/(1-0.98)=57.8, respectively, for the 2-year Moving standard deviation and the GARCH653
type measure. For Sweden, the long-run impacts are given by 0.001/(1-0.934)=0.015, and,654
0.167/(1-0.92)=2.087, respectively, for the 2-year Moving standard deviation and the GARCH655
type measure. Hence, our estimates suggest that the long-run e¤ects are much stronger than656
the short-run ones.657
To account for possible endogeneity issues, we used, in Table 6, lagged uncertainty (it 1)658
instead of current uncertainty (it). This made very little di¤erence to the empirical estimates659
(whether the 2-year Moving standard deviation or the GARCH measure is used). Indeed,660
based on the 2-year Moving standard deviation measure, the coe¢ cient on lagged uncertainty661
is estimated at 0.038 for the US, at 0.148 for the UK, and at 0.002 for Sweden (detailed results662
are available on request). Finally, to account for the fact that interest rates leveled after the663
nancial crisis, we re-estimated our models up to 2009. Again, this made very little di¤erence664
to the empirical estimates. Indeed, based on the 2-year Moving standard deviation measure,665
the coe¢ cient on lagged uncertainty is estimated at 0.036 for the US, at 0.128 for the UK and666
at 0.001 for Sweden (full details are available on request).667
5 Conclusions668
Parameter uncertainty poses a formidable problem to central banks. This paper uses distri-669
bution forecast targeting to show that in presence of parameter uncertainty the choice of the670
ination measure to stabilize remarkably a¤ects the volatility of several macroeconomic vari-671
ables, in particular of the interest rate. Specically, we nd that under DIT the volatility of the672
expected path for several variables turns out to be much less than under CPIIT. Consequently,673
under CPIIT, it is more di¢ cult to predict the expected path of the economy, in particular with674
respect to the interest rate. This result matters since the less the uncertainty surrounding the675
expected path of the short-term interest rate, the stronger the e¤ectiveness of the expectations676
channel for the transmission of monetary policy to the real side of the economy. Thus, all else677
equal, concentrating more on DIT would reduce macroeconomic volatility.678
We also think that this result is interesting with respect to nancial stability. Indeed, less679
uncertainty on the expected path of the o¢ cial rate is transmitted to market rates and asset680
prices, whose volatility determines nancial instability. When we take this hypothesis to US, UK681
and Swedish data, we nd signicant empirical evidence that interest rate volatility positively682
28
a¤ects nancial instability. Hence, we conclude that the choice of the ination targeting policy683
can also bear important consequences on nancial stability. We leave to further analysis the684
theoretical study of this relation via the inclusion of a nancial sector.685
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Appendix812
The behaviour of the private sector described by equations (16, 19, 22, 24, 27-31) is conve-813
niently rewritten in State-space form to obtain the law of motion of the economy. Then, the814
central bank problem is to nd the expected interest rate path that minimizes its loss given the815
law of motion of the economy, that is816
Minfit+ jtg1=0 Et
1X
=0
Y
0
t+KYt+
subject to
Xt+1
xt+1jt

=

A11;t+1 A12;t+1
A21;t A22;t
 
Xt
xt

+

B1;t+1
B2;t

it +

B11;t+1
B12;t

it+1jt +

"t+1
0

;
Yt  CZ;t

Xt
xt

+ Ci;tit;
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where the target variables, the predetermined variables, and the forward looking variables are,
respectively
Yt =

ct ; 
d
t ; y
d
t ; it   it 1
0
;
Xt =

dt ; 
d
t+1jt; 
i
t 1; 

t ; y
d
t ; y
i
t; y

t ; i

t ; y
d;n
t ; y
i;n
t ; it 1; qt 1; q
i
t 1; t
0
;
xt =

it; q
i
t; t; 
d
t+2jt
0
;
and where K captures the central banks preferences, a diagonal matrix with the diagonal817  
c; d; ; 

and o¤-diagonal elements equal to zero. Following the Markov Jump-Linear-818
Quadratic approach developed by Svensson and Williams (2007) we assume that the matrices819
A11;t; A12;t; B1;t; B
1
1;t; A21;t; A22;t; B2;t; B
1
2;t; CZ;t; Ci;t; (32)
are random, each free to take nj di¤erent values in period t corresponding to the nj modes820
indexed by jt 2 f1; 2; :::; ng : This means that, for example, A11;t = A11;jt . The mode jt is then821
assumed to follow a Markov process with constant and equal transition probabilities822
Pjk  Pr fjt+1 = kjjt = jg = 1
n
; j; k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng : (33)
Furthermore, modes jt and innovations "t are assumed to be independently distributed. As823
to the central bank knowledge before choosing the instrument-plan

it+ jt
	1
=0
at the beginning824
of period t; the information set consists of the probability distribution of "t; the transition825
matrix [Pjk] ; the nj di¤erent values that each of the matrices can take in any mode, and nally826
the realizations of Xt; jt; "t; Xt 1; jt 1; "t 1; xt 1; :::827
Given (33), the unique stationary distribution of the modes associated with the Markov828
transition matrix [Pjk] is a uniform distribution. This implies that the transition probabilities829
described by (33) capture the case of generalized modes uncertainty in which modes are serially830
i.i.d.. The motivation to consider this case lies in the interest of studying optimal monetary831
policy when the central bank only knows a band for each uncertain deep parameter and considers832
any realization as equally likely.833
Turning to the number of modes, letting m be the number of uncertain parameters and d834
be the number of values that each parameter can take in any period, then the number of modes835
is n = dm: In this work d = 5 and m can be either 1 or 2 or 5 depending on the uncertainty836
cases described below.837
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TABLE 1 Parameters known with certainty
Panel a (Svensson 2000) Panel b ( Leitemo and Söderström (2005))
! 0.8  2 2; 2y 1 ; y 0.3
# 1.25 w 0.15 2
yd;n;
2
yi;n
0.5 2y 0.656
 0.5 

y 0.9 
d;n
y ; 
i;n
y 0.96 2 0.389
 0.1 f 1.5 y;  ; v 0.8 2v 0.844
w 0.3 fy 0.5 2v ; 
2
 ; 
2
y 0.5 
2
 0.022
2y 0.083
v 0.5
CPIIT d = 0; c = 1;  = 0:5
DIT d = 1; c = 0;  = 0:5
838
TABLE 2 Benchmark values of the uncertain parameters
 0.8 Banerjiee and Batini (2003)
 0.66 Smets and Wouters (2005)
; i 0.5 Svensson (2000)
i 0.35 Flamini (2007)
839
TABLE 3 R for various uncertainty type. Shock: cost-push. First calibration.
Uncertainty type i
Pass-through 3.68
Persistence private sector behavior 1.16
Domestic AS slope 0.91
General 2.79
840
TABLE 4 R for various shocks and variables under general uncertainty. First calibration.
Shock c d yd i r q
Cost-push 1:08 1.15 1.48 2.79 2.62 1.44
Demand 0.89 1.16 0.95 1.05 1.05 0.82
Foreign interest rate 0.77 1.32 1.18 2.91 2.77 1.01
Natural output 0.87 1.11 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.75
Risk premium 0.71 0.90 0.82 2.09 2.05 0.77
Foreign output 0.76 1.16 0.94 2.22 2.26 0.88
841
842
TABLE 5 R for various shocks and variables under general uncertainty. Second calibration.
Shock c d yd i r q
Cost-push 1.05 1.13 1.23 1.79 1.22 2.04
Demand 0.86 1.16 0.91 0.94 1.17 1.01
Foreign interest rate 0.76 1.31 1.19 2.23 1.35 2.91
Natural output 0.87 1.12 0.99 0.89 1.12 0.95
Risk premium 0.74 1.33 1.19 2.67 1.38 3.35
Foreign output 0.77 1.15 0.94 1.75 1.19 2.22
843
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TABLE 6: Empirical FSI models
US FSI, 1990:M2-2013:M3 UK FSI, 1992:M10-2011:M12 Swedish FSI, 1995:M2-2013:M1
Intercept -0.031 -0.060 -0.094 -0.216 0.010 -0.100
(0.006) (0.008) (0.023) (0.097) (0.008) (0.009)
FSIt 1 0.970 0.971 0.976 0.980 0.934 0.920
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.025) (0.030)
it 0.043 0.187 0.001
(0.007) (0.080) (0.100)
it   0.360 1.156 0.167
(0.120) (0.486) (0.070)
SER 0.058 0.055 0.175 0.166 0.070 0.068
AIC -2.82 -2.94 -0.63 -0.73 -2.46 -2.47
844
Note: Newey-West Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation robust standard errors in brack-845
ets. SER is the Regression Standard Error, AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.846
* Uncertainty measured by 2-year Moving standard deviation.847
** Uncertainty measured by GARCH type measure.848
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 Figure 1: Unconditional distribution forecasts of the impulse responses to a cost-push shock in the 
general uncertainty case and for high smoothing preferences, i.e. 05.0 . First and second column 
report, respectively, the distribution forecasts under the DIT and CPI IT policies. Solid lines: Mean 
responses. Dark/medium/light grey bands: 30/60/90% probability bands. First calibration. 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  c to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  d to 
0 2 4 6 8
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Of   y d  to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  y i   to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  i to 
0 2 4 6 8
-0.5
0
0.5
Of  i     to 
0 2 4 6 8
-0.5
0
0.5
Of   r    to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of   q    to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  c to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  d to 
0 2 4 6 8
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Of   y d  to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  y i   to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of  i to 
0 2 4 6 8
-0.5
0
0.5
Of  i     to 
0 2 4 6 8
-0.5
0
0.5
Of   r    to 
0 2 4 6 8
-1
0
1
Of   q    to 
Figure
 
 
Figure 2: Unconditional distribution forecasts of the impulse responses to a cost-push shock in the 
general uncertainty case and for low smoothing preferences, i.e. 002.0 . First and second column 
report, respectively, the distribution forecasts under the DIT and CPI IT policies. Solid lines: Mean 
responses. Dark/medium/light grey bands: 30/60/90% probability bands. First calibration. 
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Figure 3: STD of the impulse response distribution to a cost-push shock under DIT and CPI IT for   04.0...,,005.0,002.0 and  15...,,1,0 t .  
Variables: i and  
dy , first and second row respectively. Uncertainty cases: pass-through, persistence in the behaviour of the private sector, slope of the  
domestic AS, and general, first, second, third and forth column respectively. First calibration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
 
Figure 4: Impulse response under DIT (first) and CPI IT (second) of the  
nominal interest rate to a cost push-shock assuming no parameter uncertainty  
and for high smoothing preferences, i.e. ν = 0.05. 
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Figure 5: Impulse response under DIT (first) and CPI IT (second) of the  
nominal interest rate to a cost push-shock assuming no parameter  
uncertainty and for low smoothing preferences, i.e. ν = 0.002. 
 
 
Figure
Figure 6: Financial Stress Index, Federal funds rate and Garch-type measure of uncertainty.                   
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Note: To increase readability, the GARCH measure is multiplied by 10. 
 
 
Figure
Figure 7: Financial Stress Index, Bank of England base rate and Garch-type measure of uncertainty.  
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Figure
Figure 8: Financial Stress Index, Riksbank repo rate and Garch-type measure of uncertainty.                  
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